Threshold effects of dismissal protection regulations and employment dynamics by Chen, Yu-Fu & Funke, Michael
                                                              
University of Dundee
Threshold effects of dismissal protection regulations and employment dynamics
Chen, Yu-Fu; Funke, Michael
Publication date:
2006
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Chen, Y-F., & Funke, M. (2006). Threshold effects of dismissal protection regulations and employment
dynamics. (Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics; No. 195). University of Dundee.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 19. Mar. 2016
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of 
Economic Studies, 
University of Dundee, 
Dundee. 
DD1 4HN 
 
 
Dundee Discussion Papers 
in Economics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Threshold Effects of Dismissal Protection 
Regulations and Employment Dynamics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Yu-Fu Chen and Michael Funke 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Working Paper 
 No. 195 
November 2006 
ISSN:1473-236X 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THRESHOLD EFFECTS OF DISMISSAL PROTECTION 
REGULATIONS AND EMPLOYMENT DYNAMICS 
 
 
 
Yu-Fu Chen 
 
Department of Economic Studies 
University of Dundee 
Dundee DD1 4HN 
UNITED KINGDOM 
y.f.chen@dundee.ac.uk
 
 
 
Michael Funke 
 
Department of Economics 
Hamburg University 
Von-Melle-Park 5 
20146 Hamburg 
GERMANY 
funke@econ.uni-hamburg.de
 
 
 
 
  
 
September 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Labour market regulations aimed at enhancing job-security are dominant in several OECD countries. 
These regulations seek to reduce dismissals of workers and fluctuations in employment. The main 
theoretical contribution is to gauge the effects of such regulations on labour demand across 
establishment sizes. In order to achieve this, we investigate an optimising model of labour demand 
under uncertainty through the application of real option theory. The calibration results indicate that 
labour market rigidities may be crucial for understanding sluggishness in firms´ labour demand across 
plant sizes in continental Europe.   
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1. Introduction 
 
In many continental European countries unemployment appears to reside at a persistently high level, 
with no improvement in sight. Therefore, protection of workers from dismissals has become an 
important topic of labour markets reforms in many European countries. According to the World Bank 
Doing Business database, countries vary greatly with respect to the flexibility of labour market 
regulations.1 These regulations can be provided through legislation, collective bargaining agreements or 
judicial practices and court interpretations of legislative provisions. According to the World Bank, for 
example, severance pay in Germany is set at 66.7 weekly wages, in the Netherlands at 16.0 weekly 
wages, in the UK at 33.5 weekly wages, and Portugal requires 98.0 weekly salaries as the standard 
compensation. On the contrary, the corresponding number for the U.S. is 0.0. Given these differences 
the pros and cons of deregulating labour markets are at the heart of the employment debate in many 
countries. 
An important characteristic of dismissal protection laws or collective agreements in advanced 
economies is that rules for dismissing redundant workers are differentiated by establishment size and 
the provisions are more stringent above certain employee thresholds. In Germany, the threshold in the 
“Protection Against Dismissal Act” (Kündigungsschutzgesetz) was changed several times. During the 
1990s, the threshold was changed twice, once from 5 to 10 (full-time equivalent) employees in October 
1996 by the then chancellor Helmut Kohl and then back again to 5 employees in January 1999 under 
chancellor Schröder. Finally, in January 2004 the threshold was moved once again from 5 to 10 
employees. 2  The size exemption criteria apply to establishments, not firms. An establishment is a 
production unit at a single location which can financially and/or legally belong to a larger firm. 3  
Establishments below the threshold are allowed to operate under the far less stringent rules of the 
German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch). The corresponding Austrian threshold level for 
                                                          
1 The World Bank Doing Business scoreboard on the flexibility of labour regulations and their enforcement is 
available at www.doingbusiness.org/ExploreTopics/HiringFiringWorkers/. The table provides five indicators for a 
worker in a large manufacturing firm who has been with the company for many years. (1) Difficulty of hiring a 
new worker (Difficulty of Hiring Index); (2) restrictions on expanding or contracting the number of working hours 
(Rigidity of Hours Index); (3) difficulty and expense of dismissing a redundant worker (Difficulty of Firing); (4) 
an average of the three indices (Rigidity of Employment Index), and (5) cost of a redundant worker, expressed in 
weeks of wages (Firing Costs). Higher values in the table indicate more rigid regulations.  Also see Botero et al. 
(2004). The OECD has also published indices of employment protection, again showing less protection in 
English-speaking countries [see OECD (2004)]. 
2 A recent proposal for reform of the German “Protection Against Dismissal Act” has suggested that parties 
should be allowed to agree in advance that in case of dismissals on economic grounds the employee waives 
protection and claims a statutory redundancy payment instead. 
3 In principle, this provides an opportunity for some firms to engage in strategic behaviour. If exemption is 
possible on an establishment basis, then larger firms can be split up into several establishments to elude the legal 
constraints [see Borgarello et al. (2003)]. 
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application of dismissal protection is 5 workers, while no such thresholds currently exist in the UK and 
the Netherlands.4
The potential importance of the 5-employee-threshold vs. 10-employee-threshold in the “Protection 
Against Dismissal Act” results from the fact that Germany´s economy is dominated by small and 
medium-sized firms, the Mittelstand, which has often been described as the backbone of the German 
economy.5  
Thus far, the empirical evidence concerning the impact of these thresholds on firms is rather scant. 
Bauer et al. (2004) have investigated the impact of Germany's dismissal protection legislation on 
employment in small establishments using a matched employer-employee data set. They find that the 
stringency of this legislation has no significant effect on labour turnover in such establishments. As for 
other countries, Boeri and Jimeno-Serrano (2005) study the impact of the 15-employee-threshold in the 
Italian dismissal protection legislation and also do not find any impact on employment. Verick (2004) 
presents some evidence that the loosening of the dismissal protection exemption threshold in Germany 
was associated with less employment. Finally, Messina and Vallanti (2005) show that more stringent 
firing restrictions dampen the response of job destruction and job creation to business cycles in 14 
European countries.  
Our aim is to model the effects of such thresholds upon labour demand. To this end, we construct a real 
options model of labour demand with threshold effects. This is still a blank cell in the real options 
modelling literature.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 develops the baseline theoretical model of 
employment dynamics and demonstrates the implications of various policy reforms. Section 3 extends 
the model to allow for endogenous wages and productivity with illustrative numerical examples. 
Section 5 concludes. Two appendices at the end of the paper collect some proofs and technical 
derivations which are rather involved. Readers who are not interested in the nuts and bolts of the 
derivations, can skip the appendices without losing the main argument of the paper.  
 
2. The Baseline Modelling Framework 
 
In the case of completely reversible employment decisions, a hiring (firing) decision is made if the 
wage is larger (smaller) that the marginal product of labour. As is widely acknowledged in the 
literature, this conventional valuation technique is no appropriate tool for factor demand decision 
making in the presence of uncertainty and (partial) irreversibility. The reason is that the traditional rule 
considers hiring and firing decisions only as being of a “now or never” nature.  
                                                          
4 French and Spanish laws do not exclude small businesses from dismissal protections but reduce their obligations 
with respect to severance pay (France: no cumpulsory compensation; Spain: reimbursement of severance pay from 
a fund).  
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With the appearance of the real options theory, the implication of uncertainty and partial cost 
irreversibility on factor demand decisions are well emphasised. In this section we therefore construct a 
real options model for employment under uncertainty. The stochastic framework contains the threshold 
effect induced by the “Protection Against Dismissal Act” to advance our understand of the impact of 
the institutional setting. Like other real option models of this type, the optimal employment policy is a 
trigger strategy such that hirings and firings are initiated when the marginal product of labour reaches a 
critical threshold.6 We believe this to be an appropriate framework for understanding the impact of 
threshold levels for application of dismissal protection on employment, while still yielding tractable 
results.7
We first characterise the optimal employment strategy of an imperfect competitive firm subject to 
idiosyncratic shocks and firing and hiring costs, holding wages and productivity constant. The starting 
point is the Cobb-Douglas production function 
 
(1) ,    αα −= 1tt LAKY 10 << α , 
 
where K is the capital stock,  is the employment level, tL α  is a parameter determining the shares 
between capital and labour in production, and A represents the level of technology. It is assumed that 
the firm faces an isoelastic demand function subject to multiplicative demand shocks 
 
(2) ( ) tt ZYp
ψψ−
=
1 ,  ψ ≥ 1, 
 
where p denotes the price,  is real output,  denotes the multiplicative stochastic demand shock, 
and ψ is an elasticity parameter that takes its minimum value of 1 under perfect competition. Therefore, 
the profits at t, , measured in units of output, are defined as 
tY tZ
tΠ
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
5 In 2001 about two-third of all German establishments had 1 to 5 employees. See EUROSTAT (2001) for further 
details. According to the German Statistical Office even 91 percent of all German firms had 1-9 employees in 
2006 (see http://www.destatis.de/basis/d/insol/unternehmentab2.php).  
6 In its methodological approach, the model comes within the scope of the real options literature which has 
developed rapidly over the past decade. Reviews of this burgeoning literature are provided in Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001), Copeland and Tufano (2004), Coy (1999) and Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
7 The model does not pretend to be a complete picture of the economy but rather to capture important key features 
that matter for labour market policies. For example, we have ignored behavioural assumptions regarding market 
rivalry, which in turn would necessitate some kind of game-theoretic analysis to take account of the strategic 
interactions among the firms, results of which are in turn heavily dependent on assumptions regarding the 
information sets available and the type of game being played. Leahy (1993) has shown that the assumption of 
myopic firms who ignore the impact of other firms´ actions results in the same critical boundaries that trigger 
investment as a model in which firms correctly anticipate the strategies of other firms. Grenadier (2002) has 
recently extended Leahy´s (1993) “Principle of Optimality of Myopic Behavior” to the apparently more complex 
case of dynamic oligopoly under uncertainty. Both papers therefore permit one to bypass strategic general 
equilibrium considerations when analysing factor demand under uncertainty. 
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(3) ( )tttttt LMCwLLKZA ,211 −−=Π ααψ , 
 
where ψαα =1  and ( ) ψαα −= 12 , denotes the total wage bills paid by the firm,  represents 
gross employment changes due to hiring or firing and quits from employees, and C(⋅) are the total 
employment adjustment expenditures. Following Nilsen et al. (2003), there are asymmetric fixed, 
proportional, and convex costs of adjusting employment in either direction.
twL tM
8 More specifically: 
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There is an economic meaning behind these three cost components. (1) Hiring and firing employees 
incur some proportional positive unit costs of hiring and firing,  and , respectively.hp fp 9  Firing 
employees does generate some positive costs per employee:  for . The positive 
unit costs of hiring and firing also reflect the (partial) irreversibility of employment changes; (2) the 
convex cost functions reflect the adjustment and disruptions to production processes; in case of 
asymmetric convex costs marginal cost of hiring are not the same as the marginal costs of firing; (3) the 
fixed costs of hiring and firing are related to advertising and screening and are set up to a point 
independent of the number of people hired. The costs also include fixed costs of legal consultation and 
disputes in case of firings. In addition to explicit costs, a change in the level of employment is likely to 
involve implicit costs in terms of temporary productivity losses; (4) moreover, there are no costs as long 
as no hirings/firings are made, or equivalently, C(0) = 0. 
0>− tf Mp 0<tM
The novelty of our model is that we allow for heterogeneity among firms by formalizing the threshold 
levels for application of dismissal protection which exist in many countries. We assume that the fixed 
cost of firing can be depicted by a three-parameter logistic function, ( )( )lLcf tec −−+ 01 , where l  
denotes the threshold level for application of dismissal protection,  is a scale parameter indicating the 
speed of such transition to the value of , which is the final size of fixed costs of firing when 
0c
fc L  is 
                                                          
8 In this paper, for the sake of simplicity, we specify adjustment costs as a function of gross employment changes, 
consistent with many papers in the literature [see, for example, Abowd and Kramarz (2003)]. For specifications 
based on both gross and net employment flows, see Hamermesh (1995).   
9 Following the traditional setup, adjustment costs of capital are not introduced explicitly in the problem for ease 
of notation. Firms, however, can be thought of using both capital and labour. If capital adjustment costs are 
additively separable from those for labour, i.e. there are no interrelated adjustment costs, then one could still 
obtain the same first-order conditions for labour. In our model we also abstract from the choice of hours worked 
[see Chen and Funke (2004)].     
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greater than l . By using this logistic function, changes in legislation can be accounted for in great 
detail. To see this, Figure 1 depicts the shape of the adjustment costs as a function of l and cf. 
 
Figure 1: The fixed cost function ( ) ( )( )lLcf tecLf −−+= 01  
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A simple fixed cost of hiring, , is assumed for the hiring decision. Note that all parameters in 
equation (4) are assumed to be positive. Employment evolves according to  
hc
 
(5) tt
t LM
dt
dL δ−= ,  
 
where δ represents the deterministic quit rate. We assume that the multiplicative demand shock follows 
the geometrical Brownian motion, 
 
(6)  tttt dWZdtZdZ ση += ,  
 
where  is a standard Wiener process with independent, normally distributed increments, tW η  is the 
deterministic drift parameter, and σ  is the variance parameter.10    
The next task is to characterise the objective function of the firm. The firm chooses its optimal level of 
gross employment changes, , over time to maximise the intertemporal value of profits, subject to the 
employment stock accumulation [equation (5)] and the geometrical Brownian motion [equation (6)]. 
tM
                                                          
10 At this juncture an additional remark about this stochastic process is in place. A Brownian motion with a drift is 
the limit of a random walk with uneven probabilities for negative and positive changes. A positive (negative) drift 
implies that positive (negative) changes are more likely to occur than negative (positive) changes. The drift rate 
thus represents the bias of uncertainty.  
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More precisely, we assume that the firm maximises the present discounted value of its stream of current 
and expected future profits, defined as: 
 
(7) 
( )[ ]
 (6), and (5) s.t.                                                 
,,,max 000
0
1 21 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
===−−= ∫∞
=
− MMKKZZdteMCwLLKZAEV
t
rt
ttttM
ααψ
  
 
where E[·|Ωt] denotes the mathematical expectation given the information set available to the firm at 
period t, Ωt, r > 0 is the interest rate and  is the wage bill. Applying Ito’s Lemma, the stochastic 
nature of this optimization problem requires the solution to the following Bellman equation: 
twL
 
(8)  ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
++−+−−= ZZZLM
VZZVLMVMCwLLZKAErV 221
2
1max 21 σηδααψ , 
 
where V represents the intertemporal value of the firm.11 Intuitively, equation (8) can be interpreted as 
follows: Should the option to hire be tradable and its risk diversifiable, then the expected value has to be 
equal to the foregone revenue from interest (rV). The first-order conditions for gross employment 
changes yield  
 
(9) vMp fhfh =+± γ ,  
 
where . Note that the fixed costs of employment adjustment disappear in equation (9). However, 
the fixed costs of adjustment will enlarge the inaction area due to the fact that the firm only undertakes 
employment changes if a non-negative profit arises after deducting the fixed costs. It can be shown (see 
Appendix A) that hirings and firings occur when 
LVv =
 
(10)  0
2
≥≥
h
hcM
γ
  
 
and 
 
(11)  ( )( ) 01
2
0
≤
+
−≤
−− lLc
f
f
e
c
M
γ
. 
                                                          
11 In the case of reversible hiring decisions, the effect of future profits does not occur because earlier hirings can 
be withdrawn at any time. Thus, it is sufficient to consider the marginal product of labour at present time t only. 
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 The boundaries of the inaction area satisfy: 
 
(12) hhh cpv γ2+≥  for hiring thresholds, 
 
and 
 
(13)  ( )( )lLc fff e
c
pv
−−+
−−≤
01
2 γ
 for firing thresholds. 
 
The upper threshold can be derived by finding the value of v at which an additional worker generates 
non-negative profits. The lower threshold is found in a similar fashion. It is obvious that the higher the 
fixed costs of hiring/firing ( )fh cc , , the greater is the number of hiring/firing in these employment 
decisions and the wider is the inaction area. The firm does not hire/fire employees for the boundaries of  
fhpv ±= ; it waits until the numbers of hiring/firing reaching certain values to cover the non-trivial 
fixed costs of hiring/firing so that equations (9) are satistified. The adjustment speed-related parameters 
( )fh γγ ,  also affect the numbers of hiring/firing. With a very small adjustment cost, the adjustment 
speeds increase and the firm tends to hire/fire more employees. The higher adjustment speeds due to 
smaller values of ( )fh γγ ,  also imply that the values of v do not deviate substantially from outside of 
fhpv ±=  – a smaller inaction area.
12  
For the levels of M  falling into the regime of ( )( )[ ] hhlLcff cMec γγ 212 0 <<+− −− ,  the firm 
does not hire or fire employees simply because the benefits from employment changes are not large 
enough to cover the fixed costs of hiring or firing, or even the proportional unit costs of hiring or firing. 
We can consider that hhh cp γ2+  as effective marginal hiring costs when considering mass-hiring, 
and ( )( )lLcf 1ff ecp −−++ 02 γ
                                                          
 as effective firing costs.  
The procedure in the Appendix A removes the nonlinear terms related to adjustment costs in Bellman 
equations and transfers them into parts of the effective hiring and firing costs. Thus, we have the 
following analytically solvable differential equation for the boundaries of (mass-) hiring/firing 
decisions: 
 
12 Note that contrary to the “now or never” decision in a traditional modelling framework with instantaneously and 
costlessly adjustable factors of production, the firm must choose the optimal time to fire or hire. This means  that 
at every moment it must compare the continuation value, i.e. the value of the option when kept unexercised, and 
the value of an immediate firing or hiring decision. 
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(14)   ( ) ZZZL vZZvLvwLZKAvr 22112 2
121 σηδαδ ααψ ++−−=+ − , 
 
where ,  and . Equation (14), subject to the boundary conditions of 
equations (12) and (13), can be solved to obtain the hiring and firing thresholds ( )  for the 
corresponding values of demand shocks. 
LZZ Vv = LLL Vv = LZZZZ Vv =
FH ZZ  and 
After some algebra it can be shown (see Appendix B) that the particular solutions for v denoting the 
intertemporal marginal value of employees when no hiring and firing occurs takes the form 
 
(15) δηδα
α ααψ
+
−
−+
=
−
r
w
r
LZKA
v P
2
11
2
21
, 
 
and  the general solutions for v representing the value of the real options to hire and fire are denoted by 
 
(16) , ( ) ( ) 221121 1211 βααβαα −− +−= LZKBLZKBqG
 
where  and  are two unknown positive variables to be determined by the boundary conditions – 
the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions – and 
1B 2B
1β  and 2β  are the positive and negative 
characteristic roots of the following equation, respectively: 
 
(17) ( ) ( ) 01
2
11 22 =−−−−++ ββσηβαδβδr . 
 
The term  is usually interpreted as the real option to hire and the term 
is considered as the real option to fire. The value-matching and smooth-pasting 
conditions follow, and determine the thresholds of hiring and firing.
( 121 11 βαα −LZKB )
)( 221 12 βαα −LZKB
13 Both conditions ensure that along 
the boundaries the firm is indifferent at the margin between an adjustment at date t and waiting dt to 
make the adjustment at date t + dt. The value-matching conditions are: 
 
(18) ( ) ( ) 12122121 1112
2
11
2
2
βααβαα
ααψ
γδηδα
α
−−
−
++=+
+
−
−+
LKZBcpLKZB
r
w
r
LKZA
HhhhH
H
 
 
                                                          
13 The value-matching conditions involve the value function, while the smooth-pasting conditions concern its first-
order derivatives. 
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and 
 
(19) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 2210121
21
1
2
1
1
2
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The smooth-pasting conditions take the forms: 
 
(20) ( ) ( 1211221221 11111122
2
11
2 βααββααβ
ααψ
ββ
ηδα
α
−−−−
−
=+
−+
LKZBLKZB
r
LKA
HH )  
 
and 
 
(21) ( ) ( ) 2212121121 11221111
2
11
2 βααββααβ
ααψ
ββ
ηδα
α
−−−−
−
=+
−+
− LKZBLKZB
r
LKA
FF . 
 
Equations (18) - (21) consist of a non-linear system of four equations with four unknown variables, 
, ,  and . Generally, numerical methods have to be adopted because closed-form solutions 
cannot be derived. In order to develop a “feel” for the model and to “draw a map” of the labour demand 
sensitivity to various structural characteristics of the environment in which firms operate, we calibrate 
parameters as follows. We interpret periods as years and annual rates are used where applicable. Where 
possible, parameter values are drawn from empirical studies.
HZ FZ 1B 2B
14 Our base parameters are σ = 0.1, η = 0, r 
= 0.05, δ = 0.05, , , 02.0=hp 06.0=hc 01.0=hγ , , , 05.0=fp 3.0=fc 5.0=fγ , , 
, K = 6.0, α = 0.7, ψ = 1.5 and A =1. In practice, measuring product market competition is a 
complex task. In our baseline parameter specification the price elasticity of demand parameter is set at 
Ψ = 1.50 as in Bovenberg et al. (1998). The deterministic drift term η has been set to zero to avoid any 
“bias in uncertainty”. The labour share 1-α (profit share α) is 0.7 (0.3). For simplicity, we normalise 
capital such that K = 6.0. This does not affect the qualitative results. We set A = 1 without loss of 
generality. The baseline threshold level for application of dismissal protection is l = 5. The choice of the 
remaining labour adjustment cost parameters can be explained as follows. Beyond the threshold l = 5, 
0.1000 =c
0.5=l
                                                          
14 It should be acknowledged that despite efforts to rely on multiple sources and datasets, there is inevitably an 
arbitrary and subjective aspect to some dimensions of the calibration. In particular, it is difficult to ascertain and 
quantify the extent of enforcement of statutory restrictions across firm sizes. We suggest taking an eclectic 
approach to capturing key economic features of policy interest. The basic idea is to choose coefficients that seem 
reasonable based on economic principles, available econometric evidence, and an understanding of the 
functioning of the economy, and then to look at how sensible the responses of the real options model are. 
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the effective firing costs should reach 0.6.15 Our benchmark value of ( )( )lLc fff e
c
p
−−+
+
01
2 γ
 beyond l = 
5 is 5977.05.03.0205.02 =××+=+ fff cp γ  ≈ 0.6; the effective hiring costs 
0546.001.006.0202.02 =××+=+ hhh cp γ are also in the range of 0.06 as suggested by Bentolila 
and Bertola (1990). The corresponding hiring and firing M´s are M=
h
hc
γ
2
=3.46410 for hiring and M= 
( )( )lLcf
f
e
c
−−+
−
01
2
γ
= - 1.09545 for firing after L > l = 5. Figure 2 and 3 provide a graphical 
description of the pattern of employment adjustment for l  <  5 vs. l  <  10. 
 
Figure 2: The Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation with Exempted Establishment l  <  5 
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Figure 3: The Effects of Dismissal Protection Regulation with Exempted Establishment l  <  10 
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15 Our parameters convey the message in Bentolila and Bertola (1990). Their estimated firing costs for Germany 
are in the range of 0.562 ≤ pf  ≤ 0.750, and their hiring cost estimate (excluding on-the-job-training) for Germany 
is 0.066 of the average annual wage. 
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The intuitive graphs dichotomize the space spanned by Z shocks into action and inaction areas. In the 
inaction area the marginal reward for changing employment is insufficient: neither hiring nor firing is 
optimal. The comparison of Figure 2 and Figure 3 reveals what is happening when countries try to 
deregulate labour markets by shifting the threshold where dismissal protection will be effective from l = 
5  to l = 10. The widening of the inaction area beyond the threshold indicates that the “Protection 
Against Dismissal Act” reduces the propensity to hire and fire with respect to the unregulated world.16 
The direct cost of employment protection makes adjustment of labour more expensive, which tends to 
lower firms´ willingness to hire. On the other hand, effective legal protection of existing employment 
relationships lowers the occurrence of firing during recessions. As firing and hiring incentives work in 
opposite directions, the impact of tighter or softened adjustment costs for labour is theoretically 
ambiguous. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola (1992) have demonstrated in real option models 
that the overall impact depends, inter alia, upon the size of the adjustment costs, the functional forms 
and the discount rate. Our numerical findings verify the conjecture that the overall effect is a reduction 
of the speed of adjustment to shocks, but for fixed wages ww =  the net effect turns out to be mostly 
positive. In other words, the simulations imply that firing costs have more of an effect on the firing 
decision than on the hiring decision, thereby increasing long-term employment.17
Focusing on the results close to the thresholds, the calibration results indicate that the anticipation of 
future firing costs may have current effects for a hiring firm even when the more stringent firing regime 
beyond the threshold is absent at the time of decision making. Elaborating on this idea and using our 
formal theoretical model of labour demand decisions under uncertainty, the results in Figure 2 and 3 
indicate that latent legal constraints can affect firms´ employment policy even when these firing 
constraints are currently slack. The numerical calibrations elegantly demonstrate this, as the outcome of 
a forward-looking behaviour by the small firm that expects future legal constraints to bind, resulting in 
current employment decisions to be a function both of the current legal framework but also expectations 
about their more stringent future path after growing beyond the threshold.  
 
3. Further Robustness 
 
The main conclusion of the previous Section is that firing costs beyond some thresholds tend to reduce 
both dismissals and hirings. Its overall impact on aggregate employment is likely to be positive. This 
notwithstanding, the effects of employment protection are likely to be different across firm size. 
We are aware of the many caveats that such ceteris-paribus comparison can arise. A first concern is that 
tighter employment regulations may diminish company´s ability to cope with a rapidly changing 
                                                          
16 The widening of the gap is consistent with the empirical evidence presented in Bauer et al. (2004) analysing 
worker flows in German establishments from March 1995 to March 1998 who have undergone periods of 
protection and non-protection as a consequence of the repeated changes in the German dismissal legislation. 
17 Pissarides (2001) has outlined another mechanism. He has shown that dismissal protection might increase 
welfare by providing insurance against unemployment. 
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environment driven by globalisation, technical progress, and organisational change. Caballero et al. 
(2004) have demonstrated that job security legislation hampers the creative-destruction process and 
lowers productivity growth. The clear and robust result is that tight job security regulations lower 
annual productivity growth somewhere between 0.8 and 1.2 percent. Samaniego (2006) has 
demonstrated in a theoretical model that high firing costs slow the diffusuion of new technologies via 
the mobility of entrepreneurial resources. Therefore firing costs are particularly detrimental in industries 
in which the rate of technical progress is rapid. Finally, Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Colecchia (2002) 
have also demonstrated in an independent literature that a more competitive institutional setting will 
contribute to a more innovative and dynamic economy through thriving entrepreneurial activity. 
Although these studies did not use the same methodology as in this paper, their results which are based 
on theoretical models and regressions reveal a similar story as the one below. 
In order to gauge the costs of job security provisions with endogenous creative destruction processes, 
we adapt our baseline real options model and assume that the level of aggregate productivity A is a 
function of total effective employment adjustment costs (TEEA), i.e. the magnitude of the inaction area: 
  
(22) 
TEEAA
A
×+
=
01
1 , 
 
where TEEA = hhh cp γ2+ + ( )( )lLcfff ecp −−++ 012 γ .  
 
Table 1: The Value of Productivity, A, for Different A0 and Regulation Regimes 
 L < 10 L ≥ 10 
A0=0.08 0.9917 0.9504 
A0=0.16 0.9835 0.9055 
A0=0.24 0.9755 0.8646 
 
The implications of employment-protection-induced productivity changes upon the inaction area for l = 
10 are summarised graphically in Figure 4 for A0 = 0.08, A0 = 0.16, and A0 = 0.24, respectively.18 Taking 
this productivity impact into account implies that contrary to the baseline model labour market 
regulations could indeed be a barrier to employment. 
 
                                                          
18 In the simulations we assume that the extra gains in productivity will not be eroded by higher wages. The 
deregulated labour market and the threat that jobs in advanced economies could move abroad may help to hold 
wages down. 
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Figure 4: The Inaction Area with Employment-Protection-Induced Productivity Changes for l=10 
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A second concern is that wages in the baseline model have been fixed although much of the debate of 
persistent unemployment in European economies has focused on the wage formation systems. Caballero 
and Hammour (1998) have shown that dismissal protection legislation like any other mandatory 
employment protection measure creates a hold-up problem enabling insiders (incumbent workers) to 
bid up wages once they are employed.19 In other words, firing costs make it difficult for firms to fire 
workers, so firms hesitate to hire them in the first place, strengthening the hand of unions bargaining 
with firms to set a wage. Contrary to the traditional literature holding wages fixed and looking at the 
employment effect of different degrees of job security provisions, we therefore adapt our model to an 
insider-outsider mechanism where firing costs increase the bargaining power of incumbent workers 
[see, e.g., Díaz-Vázquez and Snower (2003) and Lindbeck and Snower (1988)].20 Explicitly modelling 
the endogenous response of heterogeneous firms will help to deepen our understanding of how firms, 
industries and economies respond to policy reforms such as deregulation. For simplicity and for clarity 
of exposition we assume that wages are determined as 
 
(23) ( )(EFCrw )δ++=1 , 
 
where EFC denotes effective firing costs depicted in  = ( )( )lLcfff tecp −−++ 012 γ . Equation (20) 
constitutes an additional  “wage mechanism” in the regulation transmission channel and can be seen as 
encompassing various sources of wage rigidity. While being a short cut to a strictly micro founded 
wage equation, equation (23) constitutes a plausible starting point for analysing the impact of 
endogenous wages on the regulation transmission process. Figure 5 reports the numerical results of this 
experiment for A0 = 0.08, A0 = 0.16, and A0 = 0.24, respectively. 
 
                                                          
19 In countries with higher firing costs a large share of workers with fixed-term contracts tend to insulate insiders 
(permanent workers) from adjustment, thereby increasing their bargaining power. 
20 Lazear (1990) has claimed that the non-wage labour costs arising from mandatory dismissal protection will be 
offset by an efficient contract or bargaining process (in the sense that they do not influence equilibrium 
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 Figure 5: Hiring and Firing Thresholds with Endogenous Wages for l = 10 
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Adjustment costs of labour again induce firms to hoard labour during recessions, and also to hire fewer 
workers during boom periods. Contrary to the baseline model, however, the shape of the firing cost 
profiles implies that the insider-outsider considerations provide a channel through which the impact of 
firing costs is pulled, via wages,  towards a negative impact on average employment.21
In this Section we have provided some tests of the sensitivity and robustness of the baseline model. 
Taken together, the augmented models follows a more pronounced deregulatory line. Of course, the 
endogenous productivity and wage effects are hard to quantify. Nevertheless, this paper shows that they 
are important channels through which employment protection might affect macroeconomic aggregates 
and therefore they are the ones that should be the focus of attention.    
 
4. Conclusions 
 
Attitudes and policies towards deregulation of labour markets have been subject to considerable 
controversy and flux. Our paper fits neatly into this debate, and provides some fresh evidence on labour 
demand dynamics associated with asymmetric job security provisions across the firm size distribution.  
There has been considerable debate among politicians, unions, employer associations and economists 
about dismissal protection legislation. To contribute to this debate, we have designed and presented an 
economically meaningful and transparent dynamic model characterizing the firm´s optimal behaviour 
under uncertainty. While highly stylised, the real options model singles out important transmission 
channels and allows policy-makers to study the implications of policy interventions in alternative model 
specifications.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
unemployment, just equilibrium wages). However, labour markets are imperfect and wages are fairly rigid. It is 
therefore unlikely that dismissal costs are written into labour contracts ex-ante.   
21 This result confirms the „all or nothing“ warning issued by Coe and Snower (1997) and Orszag and Snower 
(1998). They argue that piecemeal labour market reforms may have had so little success because they disregarded 
the complementarities between a broad range of policies and institutions. 
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Appendix A: The Boundaries of the Inaction Area 
 
By substituting (9) in the text back into the Bellman equation (8) in the text and rearranging we obtain 
for the hiring and firing decisions: 
 
(A1)   
( )
ZZZ
h
h
h VZZVvL
pv
cwLLZKArV 22
2
1
2
1
2
121 σηδ
γ
ααψ ++−
−
+−−= ; 
 
(A2)   ( )
( )
ZZZ
f
f
lLc
f VZZVvL
pv
e
c
wLLZKArV
t
22
2
1
2
1
2
1
1 0
21 σηδ
γ
ααψ ++−
+
+
+
−−=
−−
. 
 
The firm would hire/hire marginal employees only if the total revenue net costs of hiring/hiring are non-
negative. Thus, for hiring decision , the firm has benefit of hiring M employees – the value of 
the firm increases by ; for hiring those M employees, the firm pays the total cost of employment for 
hiring. The hiring decisions would only happen for a certain M or greater as long as the following 
equation is satisfied: 
( 0≥M )
Mv
 
(A3)  0
2
1 2 ≥⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
++− MMpcMv hhh γ . 
 
In economic downturns, the firm endures a loss so that the value of v  is negative. By firing M  
employees , the loss of the firm is reduced by Mv , which is considered to be the benefit of 
firing 
( 0≤M )
M  empoyees; the firing also incurs some total cost of adjustment. The firm only fire a certain 
number of employees or more if the following relationship is satisfied: 
 
(A4)  ( ) 02
1
1
2
0
≥⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−
+
−
−−
MMp
e
c
Mv fflLc
f γ . 
 
Multiplying both sides of (9) in the text by M  and substituting into (A3) and (A4) gives 
 
 
h
hcM
γ
22 ≥  for hiring, 
and  
  ( )Lh
f
ec
c
M
−+
≥
0
2
1
2
γ
 for firing. 
 
Thus, for (mass-) hiring starting thresholds, we shall have 
 
(A5)  0
2
>≥
h
hcM
γ
; 
 
and for (mass-) firing starting thresholds, we need the following relationship 
 
(A6)  ( )( ) 01
2
0
<
+
−≤
−− lLc
f
f
te
c
M
γ
. 
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Substituting (A5) and (A6) back into equation (9) in the text respectively gives the hiring/firing regimes 
for the intertemporal marginal value of the firm 
 
 hhh cpv γ2+≥   for hiring regime, 
 
and   
 
( )( )lLc fff te
c
pv
−−+
−−≤
01
2 γ
 for firing regime.  
 
The boundaries of the inaction area or the beginning points of hiring and firing regimes, where 
equations hold, are then determined by the following two equations. 
 
(A7) hhh cpv γ2+=  for hiring thresholds,  
 
and  
 
(A8) ( )( )lLc fff te
c
pv
−−+
−−=
01
2 γ
 for firing thresholds.  
 
Substituting (A7) and (A8) back into Bellman equations (A1) and (A2) gives the following unified 
differential equations for hiring and firing: 
 
(A9)   ZZZt VZZVvLwLLZKArV
221
2
1
21 σηδααψ ++−−= . 
 
Using the definitions , ,  and  and differentiating both sides of 
equation (A9) with respect to L yields 
LVv = LZZ Vv = LLL Vv = LZZZZ Vv =
 
(A10)   ( ) ZZZL vZZvLvwLZKAvr 22112 2
1
21 σηδαδ ααψ ++−−=+ − , 
 
which is equation (14) in the text. 
 
 
Appendix B: The Particular and General Solutions for v 
 
Particular solutions 
 
Assume that the particular solutions have the following functional form: 
 
(B1) , bLaZKvP += −121 αα
 
We then have the following relationships: 
 
(B2) , 121 −= ααηη LZKaZvZ
 
(B3) , 0=ZZv
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(B4) . ( ) 12 211 −−−=− αααδδ LZKaLvL
 
Substituting into equation (14) in the text gives: 
 
(B5)   ( )[ ] ( )[ ] 01122 21 =+++−−+ − wbrLZKAra δαηδα ααψ . 
 
The above equation should hold for any value of marginal product of employees. Thus, we have  
 
(B6)   
ηδα
α ψ
−+
=
2
1
2
r
Aa , 
 
(B7)   δ+−= r
wb , 
 
which yields the particular solution (15) in the text. 
 
 
Homogenous solutions 
 
The homogenous part of equation (14) in the text is represented by  
 
(B6)   ( ) ZZZL vZZvLvvr 222
1
σηδδ ++−=+ . 
 
The homogenous solutions should have the same components as in particular solutions. Therefore, 
assume the following functional form for homogenous solutions: 
 
(B7) , ( )βαα 121 −= LZKBvH
 
where A is constant and to be determined by value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions. We then 
have the following relationships for homogenous solutions: 
 
(B8) , ( )βααηβη 121 −= LZKBZvZ
 
(B9) ( ) ( )βααββσσ 1222 211
2
1
2
1
−
−= LZKBvZ ZZ , 
 
(B10) . ( ) ( )βααβαδδ 12 211 −−−=− LZKBLvL
 
Substituting into equation (B6) and rearranging gives: 
 
(B11)   ( ) ( ) 01
2
11 22 =−−−−++ ββσηβαδβδr , 
 
which is (17) in the text. There are two characteristic roots for β: one positive and one negative:  
21 0 ββ >> . Therefore, the homogenous (general) solutions are shown as follows: 
 
(B12) , ( ) ( ) 221121 1211 βααβαα −− +−= LZKBLZKBvH
 17
 
which corresponds to real options to hire and fire employees respectively, and is equation (16) in the 
text. 
 
 
 
 18
References: 
 
Abowd, J.M. and F. Kramarz (2003) “The Cost of Hirings and Separations”, Labour Economics 10, 
499-530. 
 
Acemoglu, D., Aghion, P. and Zilibotti, F. (2006) “Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic 
Growth”, Journal of the European Economic Association 4, 37-74. 
 
Bauer, T.K., Bender, S. and H. Bonin (2004) “Dismissal Protection and Worker Flows in Small 
Establishments”, CEPR Discussion Paper No.4379, London. 
 
Bentolila, S. and G. Bertola (1990) “Firing Costs and Labor Demand: How Bad is Eurosclerosis?”, 
Review of Economic Studies 57, 381-402. 
 
Bertola, G. (1992) “Labor Turnover Costs and Average Labor Demand”, Journal of Labor Economics 
10, 389-402. 
 
Boeri, T. and J.F. Jimeno-Serrano (2005) “The Effects of Employment Protection: Learning from 
Variable Enforcement”, European Economic Review 49, 2057-2077. 
 
Borgarello, A., Garibaldi, P. and L. Pacelli (2003) “Employment Protection and the Size of Firms”, IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 787, Bonn. 
 
Botero, J.C., Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and A. Shleifer (2004) “The regulation of 
Labor”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 1339-1382. 
 
Bovenberg, A.L., J.J. Graafland and R.A. de Mooij (1998) Tax Reform and the Dutch Labor Market: 
An Applied General Equlibrium Approach, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, 
Research Memorandum 143, The Hague. 
 
Caballero, R.J., Cowan, K.N., Engel, E.M.R.A. and A. Micco (2004) “Effective Labour Regulation and 
Microeconomic Flexibility”, NBER Working Paper No. 10744, Cambridge (Mass.).  
 
Caballero, R.J. and M.L. Hammour (1998) “The Macroeconomics of Specificity”, Journal of Political 
Economy 106, 724-767.  
 
Chen, Y.-F. and Funke, M. (2004) “Working Time and Employment Under Uncertainty“, Studies in 
Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics 8, Issue 3, Article 5, (www.bepress.com/snde/vol8/iss3/art5). 
 
Coe, D. and Snower, D.J. (1997) “Policy Complementarities: The Case for Fundamental Labour Market 
Reform”, IMF Staff Papers 44, 1-35. 
 
Colecchia, A. (2002) “ICT Investment and Economic Growth in the 1990s: Is the United States a 
Unique Case?”, Review of Economic Dynamics 5, 408-442. 
 
Copeland, T. and V. Antikarov (2001) Real Options – A Practitioner´s Guide, London (Texere 
Publishing). 
 
Copeland, T. and P. Tufano (2004) “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options”, Harvard Business 
Review, March 2004, 90-99. 
 
Coy, R. (1999) "Exploiting Uncertainty: The Real-Options Revolution in Decision-Making", Business 
Week, June 7, 118-124. 
 
 19
Díaz-Vázquez, P. and D.J. Snower (2003) “Can Insider Power Affect Employment”, German Economic 
Review 4, 139-150. 
 
Dixit, A. and R.S. Pindyck (1994) Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton (Princeton University 
Press). 
 
EUROSTAT (2001) Enterprises in Europe, Luxembourg. 
 
Grenadier, S.R. (2002) “Option Exercise Games: An Application to the Equilibrium Investment 
Strategies of Firms”, Review of Financial Studies 15, 691-721.  
 
Hamermesh, D.S. (1995) “Labor Demand and the Source of Adjustment Costs”, The Economic Journal 
105, 620-634. 
 
Leahy, J. (1993) “Investment in Competitive Equilibrium: The Optimality of Myopic Behaviour”, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 108, 1105-1133. 
 
Lindbeck, A. and D.J. Snower (1988) The Insider-Outsider Theory of Employment Protection, 
Cambridge (MIT Press). 
 
Messina, J. and G. Vallanti (2005) “Job Flow Dynamics and Firing Restrictions: Evidence from 
Europe”, ECB Working Paper No. 602, Frankfurt. 
 
Nilsen, A., Salvanes, K.G. and F. Schiantarelli (2003) “Employment Changes, the Structure of 
Adjustment Costs, and Plant Size”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 920, Bonn. 
 
OECD (2004) OECD Employment Outlook, Paris. 
 
Orszag, M. and Snower, D.J. (1998) “Anatomy of Policy Complementarities”, Swedish Economic 
Policy Review 5, 303-343. 
 
Pissarides, C. (2001) “Employment Protection”, Labour Economics 8, 131-159.  
 
Samaniego, R.M. (2006) “Employment Protection and High-Tech Aversion”, Review of Economic 
Dynamics 9, 224-241. 
 
Verick, S. (2004) “Threshold Effects of Dismissal Legislation in Germany”, IZA Discussion Paper No. 
991, Bonn. 
 
 20
